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DAVID JOSIAH BREWER AND THE
CHRISTIAN CONSTITUTION
J. GORDON HYLTON*
Professor Berg does a great service by reminding us that religion has
been an important factor in the lives of many of the men and women
who have served on the United States Supreme Court. Unfortunately,
historians, legal scholars, and judicial biographers have paid scant atten-
tion to this aspect of our constitutional experience. I hope to illustrate
the advantage of exploring the connections between religious belief and
constitutional theory through a brief examination of the life and career
of Justice David Josiah Brewer, who figures prominently in Professor
Berg's paper.
Brewer was born in Smyrna, Asia Minor, to missionary parents in
1837. He was raised in New England, but in the late 1850s, he migrated
to Kansas where he later served on the state supreme court and the fed-
eral circuit court. He was appointed to the United States Supreme
Court in 1889 and served until his death in 1910. As Professor Berg
suggests, Brewer was one of the most unabashedly religious men ever to
sit on the Court. His father, Josiah Brewer, was a Congregationalist
minister who was also an abolitionist, an educator, a prison reformer,
and a missionary. Although the younger Brewer did not follow his fa-
ther into the ministry, he was an active member of the Congregational
Church throughout his entire adult life. As a Supreme Court Justice, he
delivered countless public addresses to religious groups; he taught Sun-
day School on a weekly basis; he was an active member of the American
Bible Society, the American Home Missionary Society, and the Ameri-
can Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions; and he regularly con-
tributed articles on religious themes to periodicals like Young People's
Weekly, Sunday School Times, and Christian Endeavor World. He also
published three short books on explicitly religious topics: The Pew to
the Pulpit. Suggestions to the Ministry from the Viewpoint of a Layman
(1897); The Twentieth Century From Another Viewpoint (1899); and his
best known and most controversial work, The United States: A Christian
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University. Ph.D., Harvard University; J.D., Uni-
versity of Virginia; A.B., Oberlin College.
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Nation (1905).'
He also supported a wide variety of social causes associated with re-
formist Christianity. He was an advocate of women's suffrage, Asian-
American rights, the initiative and referendum, prison reform, the rights
of the handicapped, the conservation of natural resources, and the edu-
cation of African-Americans. He was also a staunch anti-imperialist and
an opponent of militarism who gained national attention as a supporter
of international arbitration and disarmament. During the administra-
tion of Theodore Roosevelt, he risked the approbation of his fellow Re-
publicans by publicly criticizing the president for his militaristic foreign
policy.2
Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence that David Brewer ever
wavered from his religious convictions. He never suffered a crisis of
faith of the sort that afflicted many of his contemporaries. Had he stood
on Dover Beach with his contemporary Matthew Arnold, he would have
seen, not Arnold's "darkling plain swept with confused alarms of strug-
gle and flight," but a "sea of faith... [girded] ... round earth's shore."3
When he died in 1910, he was eulogized by the religious press as a man
of faith and a staunch advocate of traditional religion.
However, merely to acknowledge Brewer's religiosity and his will-
ingness to align himself with Christian causes does not tell us what, if
any, effect these beliefs had upon his performance as a Supreme Court
justice, or how they shaped his views on the Constitution. If one is con-
cerned about the relationship between religious belief and judicial be-
havior, one must look deeper than overt statements of religiosity in Su-
preme Court opinions and public addresses. Because of the complexity
of the American religious experience and the rich, textured nuances of
American Christian theology, we do the judges of the past and present a
1. Unless otherwise noted biographical materials in this essay are taken from sources
cited in my two earlier writings on David Josiah Brewer: J. Gordon Hylton, The Judge Who
Abstained in Plessy v. Ferguson: Justice David Brewer and the Problem of Race, 61 MisS. LJ.
315, 324-26 (1991) and J. Gordon Hylton, David Josiah Brewer: A Conservative Justice Re-
considered, 1994 J. SUP. Cr. HIsT. 45. The Brewer Family Papers at Yale University are the
principal source of biographical information pertaining to David Brewer. The only full length
studies of Brewer's career are MICHAEL J. BRODHEAD, DAVID J. BREWER: THE LIFE OF A
SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, 1837-1910 (Southern Ill. Univ. Press 1994) and Lynford A. Lard-
ner, The Constitutional doctrfnes of Justice David Josiah Brewer (1938) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University).
2. For Brewer's off-the-bench activities, see, W. H. Baldwin, Justice Brewer and Organ-
ized Charity, 24 THE SURVEY 119 (1910); Michael J. Brodhead, Justice David J. Brewer: A
Voice of Peace on the Supreme Court, YEARBOOK OF THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL
SOCIETY 93 (1985).
3. THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE, 1378-79 (4th ed. 1978).
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- disservice if we measure them by a too general notion of what it means
to be a religious judge.
In searching for the specific tenets of Brewer's theological beliefs,
his formal religious writings are disappointingly short on details.
Brewer was no theologian and he knew it; in fact, he often seemed unin-
terested in formal theological debates. In an 1897 speech to the students
at the Yale Divinity department, he encouraged the future ministers in
the audience to avoid theological discussions and abstractions when in
the pulpit. "Do not give a lecture, but preach,"4 he told his audience.
"[L]eave your manuscript at home and talk to us."5 In his own public
speeches and religious writings he typically emphasized that God was an
infinite being behind the material world and that Christ was the incarna-
tion of the infinite; that there was no greater cause than Christian unity;
and that the law and the gospel had always to be read together. Beyond
this, he rarely offered much of theological substance.
Nevertheless, it is possible to reconstruct Brewer's deeper beliefs
about the nature of God, God's relationship to man, and the state's rela-
tionship to both from other sources available to the biographer. Such an
analysis begins with the rich protestant religious culture of antebellum
New England of which Brewer was a product. While the New England
of Brewer's youth produced individuals as diverse in their religious
views as WiJliam Lloyd Garrison, Joseph Smith, Charles Finney, Marga-
ret Fuller, Orestes Brownson, Henry David Thoreau, Nathanial Haw-
thorne, Mary Baker Eddy, Philip Brooks, and John Brown, at its core
the religious life of the region was dominated by Congregationalists
trying to come to grips with the Second Great Awakening and Jack-
sonian democracy. It is in Brewer's relationship to this particular strand
of Christianity that one discovers the linkage between theological belief
and political theory.
Other than his father's influence, nothing did more to shape the
world view of the young David Brewer than his student years at Yale
College in the mid-1850s. (Brewer began his collegiate studies at
Wesleyan in 1853, but transferred to his father's alma mater in 1855.)
At Yale, he studied under the guidance of a distinguished faculty, all
protestant and mostly trained as ministers, who collectively were en-
gaged in an effort to reconcile the Calvinist tradition with contemporary
notions of democratic society. They were about, as one of Yale's histo-
4. DAVID J. BREWER, THE PEW TO THE PULPIT (New York, Fleming H. Revell Co.
1897).
5. Id. at 44.
1998]
MARQ UETTE LAW REVIEW
rians has put it, "scholarly means to evangelical ends.",6 No member of
the Yale faculty had greater influence on Brewer than Theodore Dwight
Woolsey. Woolsey was an ordained Congregationalist minister who
served for a quarter century as Yale's president and is often credited as
the founder of American political science. In 1855-56, Brewer attended
Woolsey's lectures on history and political science as a 19 year-old col-
lege senior.7
Although it is possible that Woolsey's lectures only confirmed what
Brewer had been taught by his minister father, Woolsey's influence on
Brewer was undeniable. One cannot leaf through the pages of Wool-
sey's writings without being struck by their similarity to Brewer's later
judicial opinions. Certainly Brewer did nothing to disguise his admira-
tion for Woolsey. In 1871, he initiated a movement to establish a
"Woolsey Professorship of International Law" at Yale to honor the re-
cently retired Woolsey, and after his death two decades later, Brewer
lauded him as one of the nation's greatest educators and political theo-
rists."
Woolsey's theory of the state was founded on the belief that there
was a divinely authored moral order and that man was a free moral be-
ing.9 Every individual had certain God-given rights-the "powers and
prerogatives with which the individual is invested" which were to be
used "for the purpose of developing his nature, [and which].other indi-
viduals are bound to leave undisturbed.' 0 The function of the state was
to aid in the moral self-development of the individual by protecting
these rights, and by maintaining a climate in which moral development
could occur, since it was "in the natural order of things, God's method
6. LOUISE L. STEVENSON, SCHOLARLY MEANS TO EVANGELICAL ENDS: THE NEW
HAVEN SCHOLARS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA, 1830-
1890 (1986).
7. Catalogue of the Officers and Students of Yale College, 1855-56.
8. Charles Fairman, The Education of a Justice: Justice Bradley and Some of His Col-
leagues, 1 STAN. L. REV. 217, 244 (1949); David J. Brewer, Undated Remarks to Yale
Alumni Association (1892) (Brewer Family Papers) (on file at Yale Law School).
9. THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, POLITICAL SCIENCE OR THE STATE THEORETICALLY
AND PRACTICALLY CONSIDERED 1 (1877). Woolsey's treatise repeated most of the points
made in his lectures delivered in the 1840's and 1850's, the texts of which are in the Woolsey
Family Papers at Yale University. On the similarity of the lectures and Woolsey's later trea-
tise, see Stevenson, supra, note 5, at 189 (discussing the similarity between Woolsey's lectures
and his later treatise).
10. Woolsey, "Particular Rights" (lecture), quoted in Stevenson, supra, note 5, at 106.
The first two chapters of Woolsey's treatise are devoted to the subject of rights. See Woolsey
supra note 8, at 1-119.
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of helping men towards a perfect life."'1 To this end, the state could
guard the morality of the people by outlawing public behavior counter-
productive to self-development, and it could enact laws to promote the
general well being, so long as the power was not exercised in such a way
as interfere with the individual right of moral self-development.
The state could levy taxes, regulate the use of property (including
absolute prohibitions of certain uses), establish public schools, adopt
compulsory attendance laws for minors, promote industry, transporta-
tion, and health, define acceptable noise levels and sanitary practices,
establish regulations regulating marriage, divorce, and descent, promote
religion, and even establish a church, if the freedom to worship was not
impaired.
On the other hand, the state could not substitute its own judgment
for that of the individual in matters that affected the process of moral
development. "Society," Woolsey maintained,
was never meant to be the principal means by which the perfec-
tion of the individual was to be secured, but only the condition
without which that perfection would be impossible... If he [the
individual] thinks that the end of government is to support him,
to point out to him ways of industry, to lead the way in every en-
terprise, he remains a dependent, undeveloped citizen; he is not a
freeman in his spirit.
2
In other words, the obligation to facilitate moral development meant
that the state would be active in certain areas, but passive in others. Ul-
timately, this led Woolsey to enumerate a list of rights which no just
government ought to take away. 3
Like Woolsey, Brewer believed that moral choices were genuine
only if freely made by the individual." Consequently, to interfere with
the right of choice on the grounds that the state (or the majority) knew
better than the individual was to frustrate God's design. According to
Brewer, Christ's emphasis on the individual rather than the state had
"laid the foundation of a truer and nobler republic"'5 and that majorities
11. Woolsey, supra, note 8, at 195.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Theodore D. Woolsey, Relation of Christianity to the Doctrine of Natural Rights, 15
NEW ENGLANDER 631 (1857); Woolsey, supra, note 8, at 211.
14. Brewer developed his argument in regard to the connection between Christianity
and individualism in THE PEW TO THE PULPIT and The Religion of a Jurist, 80 THE
OUTLOOK 533 (1904).
15. Lynford A. Lardfier, The Constitutional Doctrines of Justice David Josiah Brewer
59 (1938) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (quoting David J. Brewer,
The Scholar in Politics, TOPEKA DAILY CAPITAL, June 13, 1883).
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could not be trusted to be wiser than individuals, since "the Almighty is
wiser than even such majority, and He has decreed it best for man to
leave each free to work out his own salvation.' ' 16 Like Woolsey, he also
saw a potential conflict between individual accountability and a pater-
nalistic state. As he noted in 1906, "[T]oo much and too frequent inter-
ference by government blunts the sense of individual responsibility, and
the danger is that we drift to a condition where the individual abandons
his own duty and simply appeals to government.'
17
Nevertheless, Brewer did not believe in an inactive state. Thoreau's
maxim that the government that governs best governs least had no ap-
peal to him. Although the pursuit of salvation was ultimately the re-
sponsibility of the individual, the state had a responsibility to facilitate
that process. When it legislated for the purposes of assisting the process
of moral self-development, it was well within its constitutional authority.
While Woolsey viewed the support of individual moral development
as the test of legislative legitimacy, Brewer elevated the concept to a
constitutional standard. Through its guarantee of the rights to life, lib-
erty, and the pursuit of happiness, the Declaration of Independence had,
Brewer maintained, made the protection of the individual's right to pur-
sue his own destiny the cornerstone of American constitutionalism. The
Constitution, he insisted, also embodied this same principle, even
though it was not so clearly articulated in its text. The failure to honor
this principle had necessitated the Fourteenth Amendment which had
been adopted to insure that state governments honored the same fun-
damental principle. 8 Consistent with this principle, Brewer believed
that the task of the judge was to draw the line between legislation that
served the legitimate interests of the state and its citizens and that
which, for whatever motives, impaired the individual's right of moral
self-development. Knowing where to draw this line was no easy mat-
ter-Woolsey had acknowledged that it was often impossible to draw "a
clear line between the grounds on which particular regulations for the
public welfare may be made."'9 However, Brewer never seemed to
doubt that his duties as a Supreme Court Justice obligated him to evalu-
ate legislation by this standard.
16. David J. Brewer, The Scholar in Politics, TOPEKA DAILY CAPITAL, June 13, 1883,
David J. Brewer, Some Thoughts About Kansas, 12 KAN. BAR ASS'N REP. 61,70 (1895).
17. David J. Brewer, Two Periods in the History of the Supreme Court, 19 REP. VA. BAR
ASS'N 133, 153 (1906).
18. David J. Brewer, The Protection of Private Property from Public Attack, 55 NEW
ENG. AND YALE REV. 97,109-10 (1891).
19. Woolsey, supra, note 8, at 220.
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In this light, certain features of Brewer's voting record on the Su-
preme Court become more understandable. As Professor Berg noted,
Brewer is commonly remembered as one of the Supreme Court's
staunchest defenders of laissez-faire. Though he wrote neither opinion,
Brewer was part of the majority in the infamous Lochner v. New York,20
which struck down a maximum hours law for bakers1 , and in Adair v.
United States," which overturned a federal prohibition of "yellow dog"
contracts. He also dissented (without opinion) in cases involving stat-
utes limiting the number of hours that could be worked per day in un-
derground mines, smelters, and refineries' and by public works employ-
ees;, 4 the payment of wages in scrip or vouchers rather than cash;' and
the payments of miners on the basis of the weight of coal as mined
rather than its weight after screening." He also dissented from a deci-
sion of the Supreme Court upholding the power of a state to require
mandatory innoculation for smallpox.27
It is a mistake, however, to conclude from such decisions that
Brewer was an irresolute foe of state regulatory authority. Claims that
he was have always been based upon his decisions in a small number of
cases. In fact, in the vast majority of cases involving challenges to the
state police power, Brewer came down on the side of regulatory author-
ity. In over 500 cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1890 and
1910 involving Fourteenth Amendment challenges (like Lochner),
Brewer sided with the state 86.2% of the time.' Although he expressed
reservations about the possibility of achieving individual moral reform
through legislation, Brewer was willing to grant the state broad author-
ity to regulate morals.29 Bans of gambling, lotteries, and prostitution
20. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
21. Id. at 64.
22. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). A "yellow dog" contract made the employee's agreement not
to join a labor union a condition of the employment contract. Id. at 180.
23. See Holder v. Hardy 169 U.S. 366,380 (1898).
24. See Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207,207-08 (1903).
25. See Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 17 (1901).
26. See McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539,543 (1909).
27. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905).
28. For a detailed discussion of Brewer's voting record in police power cases, see Hyl-
ton, David Josiah Brewer supra, note 1, at 48.
29. In L'Hote v. New Orleans, he observed, "[N]either the [Fourteenth] Amendment-
broad and comprehensive as it is-nor any other amendment, was designed to interfere with
the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to pro-
mote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people." 177 U.S. 587, 596
(1900) (quoting Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27,31 (1885); see also, DAVID J. BREWER, THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY FROM ANOTHER VIEWPOINT 51-52 (New York, Fleming H. Revell
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were legitimate exercises of state power, as was the prohibition of the
sale of alcoholic beverages, the criminalizing of polygamy, and the en-
actment of Sunday closing laws. 3° Nor was he automatically inclined to
invalidate all labor legislation. He was a supporter of occupational li-
censing,3 and he voted to uphold statutes that prescribed the way in
which back wages were to be paid to discharged railroad workers.n He
also approved a maximum eight-hour day for workers employed on fed-
eral public works projects33 and a statute which regulated the advance
payment of seamen's wages.' 4 He was also the author of the landmark
opinion in Muller v. Oregon,3' which upheld the constitutionality of a
maximum-hours statute for female workers against a liberty of contract
challenge.
This seeming contradiction in Brewer's approach to police power
cases can be understood when reexamined in light of the theological as-
sumptions he shared with his former teacher. Statutes that facilitated
the right of moral self-development were valid because they made it
more likely that man, or woman, could obtain the salvation which was
the purpose of their earthly existence. On the other hand, paternalistic
legislation was unacceptable if it did not advance the cause of moral
self-development and instead sent the message that the state rather than
the individual was the proper agent for moral choice. To draw such a
distinction was not to simply substitute the judge's views for those of the
legislature, because, in Brewer's view, the right to moral self-
development was the most fundamental of constitutional rights. This is
not to say that Brewer necessarily drew that line in the logically correct
places, but it does explain why he was convinced of the constitutional
necessity of line drawing.
This is just one example of how Brewer's religious beliefs shaped his
constitutional views in cases that on the surface had little to do with
formal religion. A product of particular tradition in a particular time,
Brewer's religious views were an integral part of his intellectual
makeup. Because he started with his religious beliefs and then worked
out a compatible theory of the Constitution, he was literally incapable of
Co. 1899); DAVID J. BREWER, supra, note 15, at 133.
30. For a discussion of Brewer's views on the regulation of vice, see DAVID J. BREWER,
THE UNITED STATES: A CHRISTIAN NATION 56 (1905).
31. See Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 506 (1903).
32. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Paul, 173 U.S. 404,405 (1899).
33. See Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 255 (1907).
34. See Patterson v. The Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 170 (1903).
35. 208 U.S 412,416 (1908).
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deciding any case without being influenced by those views. To describe
David Brewer's view of the United States Constitution without taking
into account his religious beliefs would be to describe a book without
looking inside its covers.

